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ABSTRACT
Theoptimal incaie taxation problemhasbeenextensively studied in one-
period nzxlels. When consi.niers work for many periods, this paper analyzes 'what
information, if any, that the goverrient learns about abilities in one period
can be used in later periods to attain re redistribution than in a one-
period world. When the govertinent nhast cc*niit itself to future tax schedules,
the gains c fran relaxing self-selection constraints by intertaiporal
nonstationarity. The effect of nonstationarity is analogous to that of
raridanization in one-period nh,dels.
In a ncdel with two ability classes it is shown that the key use of
information is that only a single lifetine self-selection constraint for each
type of constziEr Ixiast be imposed. Sa'e necessary and sufficient conditions
for randanization or nonstationarity are given. The planner can make
additional use of the information when individual and social rates of tine
discounting differ. In this case, the limiting tax schedule is a
nondistorting one if the goverrrnt has a lower discount rate than
individuals.
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Most optimal incare tax nixiels in the Mirrlees [1971] tradition analyze
only a single period. If individuals are identifiable across periods,
questions arise about the continued validity of the results in those models.
An obvious objection is that, in the first period, the goverrnEnt learns
dividua' abilities and therefore should be able to attain a first best
result in the next period. If individuals do not recognize that their second
period taxes depend upon their first period behavior, this conclusion is
correct. However, if individuals correctly anticipate this linkage and adjust
their behavior accordingly, the gain fran using the information is at least
partially negated. This paper considers whether the first best outc can be
achieved in later periods despite this response by individuals and if not,
whether the use of any information fran period one can lead to an inprovmnt
over sfnle repetition of the one period optimal tax schedule.
The model has individuals of t discrete ability classes. The
goverrnint knows the size and ability level of each class but does not
initially know to which class any particular individual belongs. This paper
thus adapts the one period model of Stiglitz [1982a1 to a many period
situation and relaxes assunptions about the preferences of the t classes.
1 different assunptions about the governrent's use of information can
be made. One is that the goverrnnent is able to ccmiiit itself to the tax
schedules it will use in each period and thus to limit the extent to which it
uses information about an indivichial's ability, learned fran the taxes paid in
one period, to affect the taxes paid in later periods. The other is that the
governnnt cannot ccmnit itself in advance not to use information to the full
extent. Once an individual's ability is learned, the goverrilEnt is not only
able to impose hmp simi taxation but does so as soon as possible. Both
assurptions are rth studying. The second may be more realistic since it may2
in fact be impossible for goverrmEnts to carinit themselves even by constitu-
tiorial maans since later goverrirnts can change rules and constitutions. On
the other hand, the no cannitnEnt solution is feasible when caiinitnnt is
possiblebut notthe reverse. Hence, the first assixnption allows studying a
benchnark case'kere informationisused optimally across periods.In this
paper,the first assulptionofcannitnntismade. Elsewhere, we analyzethe
nocaimitnntcase.
When the goverriintcan cannit itself,the following results areshown:
(1) If first best is not optimal in a one period nxxlel, itis not
optimalin later periods of a milti-period mxlel.
(2) The self-selection constraint creates a potential nonconvexity which
flip lies that somatiixs it may be desirable to have different tax functions in
each period.
(3) When the tax structure differs between periods,the informationfrctn
the firstperiodincorporated in later periods' schedules is only an
individual's abilityclass. Theplanner usesthisto incorporatealarge
penalty in laterperiodsfor an agent who acts in the second period as if his
ability differs fran that revealed in the first, thus forcingagents to be
consistentin their behavior across periods.
These results follow fran noting that a nultiperiod optimal tax nxdel and
a one period wdel with randan taxation as discussed in Stiglitz [1982a] are
essentially the sanE. The randan tax nxxiel has no restrictions on the
relative frequencies with which different schedules are offered. With an
infinite horizon, it is possible to exactly duplicate the randan solution.
Howsver, in a finite period iu,del, restrictions exist on the frequency with
which bundles can be offered over tinE. In addition, the nailtiperiod mdel
may be uore restrictive if it has period-by-period governnEntbudget
constraints instead of one intertenporal constraint. Despite these extra3
restrictions, similar argnnts showthatdifferent tax schedules in different
periods may be desirable. Intertiporal nonstationarity isan alternative
rrthod of inip1nting randan taxes that does notrequire either ex ante or ex
post violations of horizontal equity.
(4) The "single crossing" assunption camKn tomany self-selecticxi
uodels is riot needed for uost results. At theoptiniim, at nxst one self-
selection constraint can bind whether or notsingle crossing is asstid. A
ccxrplete characterization of the solution to theone-period probln, with and
without randcm taxation, is given both in terms oftaxes and the Pareto
frontier. These results are re general thanpLevic*is analyses since no
specific relationship beten the classes is assuied.
(5) en a self-selection constraint binds, randanization isdesirable for
any indifference map under a sufficiently concave transformation of theutility
function of the class with the binding constraint. Ifa local randairLzation
inproves upon the nonrandctii solution, then forany three probabilities, s
lottery with those probabilities inprovesupon the nonrandan solution.
In section II, the basic nxxlel is described and results fora one period
ndel with and without randanization are derived. Inaddition, nre general
conditions are derived for randcl,1i7.ation to be desirable thanhave previously
appeared in the literature. In section III, the niiltiperiod problan is
considered. Results are given for a single intert,oralgoverr1int budget
constraint and for separate period-by-period constraints. The resultsdepend
upon whether the goverritnt 's and individuals' discount rates differ. If they
are equal, information is used across periods only to nthnic randcxnization.
Wcien they differ, systratic use of informationoccurs since "trade" between
the goverrnt and individuals is now possible due to differentdiscount
rates. In section IV, sa general conclusions are drawn about theuse of
information in optimal tax nodels.4
II. Taxation in a One Period ?bdel
In this section, we analyze the basic one periodtrodel.Theresults here
generalize those in Stiglitz [1982a1and help draw the analogy between randan
taxation and nultiperiod taxation.
A.Basic AssimptioflS
A society is ccxnposed of two differentclasses of individuals denoted A
and B. The individuals within each class areidentical but the two classes
differ either in tastes or abilities. The goverrintis assuxd initially not
to know to which class any individual belongsbut to know the niithers of
individuals in each class, denotedi =a,b. Individuals corisui a single
good, C, and earn incai, Y. Peoplein each class have a utility function
overthesebundlesV1(C, Y), i=a, b, withV1/3C >0 0.
The maxinun incam that individuals in eachclass can earn is bounded fran above
by K1 so that Y11(1,=a,b. The marginal rate of substitution for a given
individual isdenoted FIRS1(C, Y) -V/V>0,i =a,b.
Thefollowing asstnnptionsare made about V1(C, Y):
(Al)V1(C, Y), i =a,b, is twice continuously differentiablein C and Y;
(A2) V1(C, Y), i =a,b, is strictly concavein C and Y;
(A3) MRSa(C, Y) andb(C Y) differatalnxst every (C, Y) bundleand
points sihere the MRS 's areequal are not where theindifference curves
are tangent tothe no-tax budgetline.
Assuliption(Al) is made for convenience but couldbe relaxedwithout
difficulty. Assuiptiori (A2) of concavity(instead of quasiconcavity) insures
that expected utility in the randantaxation nDdel and lifetize discounted
utility in iiultiperiod nixielsdescribe convex preferences. Asstmption (A3) is
crucial in guaranteeing that the two groups actuallyhave different preferences
since, if their indifference curvescoincide, redistribution between groups is5
impossible.Assurrption(A3) allowstheindifference curves of the two classes
tohave railtiple crossings. If thereare uultiplecrossings, then there will be
bundlesat 'which the indifference curves of the two groups are tangent, having
eqial marginal rates of substitution. Such tangencies are not ruled out as long
as they form discrete lines in the (C, Y) planeJ
A special case satisfying these assunptions is that considered in
Stiglitz [1982a1 in 'which the utility functions V1(C, Y) arise francon
underlying preferences over corisunption and labor with the classes A and B
having different abilities (arid wages). Let L1 be hours worked aridw the wage
rate of group i. Then L1 =Y/wandV1(C,Y) =U(C,Yfw) 'where U is the ccxmon
utility function over C and L. If A is the nre able group (Wa >
Wb)then
NRSa (C, y) <b(C, Y) at each (C, Y)As shown below, such a "single
crossing" assunption is unnecessary for nxst of the standard results.
B.Nonrandan Taxation
AssunE that the governnEnt nnst :impose the sai tax oneveryone who earns
the s inccxiE either to satisfy horizontal equity or for administrative
ease. It cannot randanly charge son individuals a different tax than others.
Since the goverriint cannot distinguish individuals of the two classes, it nust
therefore offer a single tax schedule T(Y) to all individuals .Anindividual
belonging to either class then faces a budget constraint C Y -T(Y)and
maximizes utility subject to this constraint taking the tax schedule as given.
For each possThle tax schedule, there will be a best consutption-incaiE vector
(C1(T), Y1(T)) for each class and a utility for each class v1T =V-(C1(T),
Y1(T)). It is clear that forany T,v1T V1& (T), Y3 (T)) ij, since 1LTis
the max nun given the constraint and (C3(T), Y3(T)) is a feasible vector for
both classes.4 Budget balance, NaT(Ya) + NbTd)0, mist also be satisfied
for easty5 The governmant then seeks the tax function 'which yields the6
"best" pair of utilities (Va.T,vbT).This best pair could be selected according
to a social welfare function. For any social welfare function,the pair (VaT,
vbT will be a constrained Pareto optilmill. Thus, in this paper, we consider the
set of Pareto-optimal utilities without arbitrarily assuiing a particular
welfare function.
Since directly searching over tax functions to find the optiimun is
difficult, an equivalent problan is solved of choosing(C1, Y1) pairs for each
classthatsatisfy self-selection constraints, V1(C1,Y1)V1(C3, Y3), i =a
andb and ji.Thatis,individuals in neitherclasscanprefer thebundle
assigned to the other class to their own. These self-selectionconstraints
are necessary and sufficient for there to exist a taxfunction under which the tclassesoptiially choose the assigned bundles. Necessity was argued
above.To show sufficiency, note thatifY1 y3 then C' >C3 trustalso hold
or both classes prefer (C3, y3). Considerthetax function,
T(Y) =Y,Y <y, T(Y) =Y-C3, yJ Y < Y1, T(Y) =- C'-,y'
Under this step function, the only bundles which individuals in either class
could choose are (0, 0), (C3, Y3), and (C', Y'). This follows,forexanple,
since (C1, Y) is preferred to any bundle (C1,Y),Y> Y1, which are the only
ones possible for incaxes greater thanY'. In addition, under boundary
conditions on preferences, either bundle will be preferred to (0, 0). Under
this tax function, individuals in class i can do nobetterthan (C', Y') and
those in jcando nobetterthan (C3,
6Given the iridividn1s' budget
constraints, budget balance is satisfied if Na(Ca - +Nb(Cb -yb)0
(aggregateconsuiption no greater than aregateincane).
Thegoverruxent' soneperiod nonrandan Pareto taxation problan then can be
written as mnaximization problen (P1)7
(P1)MaxCLNaVa(Ca, Ya) + (1-a)NbVb(Cb, b)





whereais a paraneterwhichcan bevariedbetween 0and 1 to findthe
constrainedPareto frontier, A,i =a,b, is the Lagrange nultiplier
associatedwith the self-selection constraint of class i; and is the
Lagrange niiLtiplier associated with the resource balance constraint.
**J*j.* Theorn I:Forall a c [0, 1], there exists a solution ((Ca y), (( y ))
tomaximization probln (P1).
Proof: The constraint set is nonanpty since any= = Ca= min(K, Kb)
satisfies all the constraints in (P1). The constraint set is closed because all
constraint functions are continuous inthe choicevariables and the constraints
are specified by weak inequalities. Inccts are bounded by assttption and these
bounds imply that consunptions are bounded through the resource constraint.
Hence, the constraint set is bounded. The objective function is continuous and
thus attains a maxinun on the nonnpty ccmpact constraint set. Q.E.D.
To characterize the solution to (P1), let C1 (a),y1(a),and
V1(a)V1(C1(a), Y1(c)), i =a,b, be the optiiiul bundles and utilitiesas
functionsofcz. LetV10, i =a,b, be the utilities of each group in the no
taxsituation.
Theorn II: The solution to (P1) satisfies the followingproperties:
(i)If V'(a)Vi then V1(&(a), Y3(a)) <V1(a),i =a,b and ji.8
(ii) If V1(ct) =V1(C3(cL),y-()) then V3(cL) >V3(C1(a),y3-(cL)),i=a,b and
ji.
(iii) >0
(iv) If =0then MR&(C(ct),Y(ci))=1,i =a,band ji
(v)
1 <MRS3(C3(cL), y3(ci)) <NRS1(C3(cx),Y3(CL)), or
MRS1(C3(a), Y3()) <MR&(C3(ct),y3(c*)) <1.
Beforeproving TheoraiiII,an explanation oftheseconditionsis in order.
Thefirst says that the self-selection constraint does not bind for a group
which receives higher utility than in theno-tax situation.The second says
that at nost oneself-selectionconstraint can bind at the optTTIm --even
with nultiple crossings of theindifferencecurves. The third says that
production efficiency is satisfied in that all production is consunEd (Na(Ca -
ya)+rccb -Yb) = 0).The fourth says that, if the self-selection
constraint does not bind for group i, then the opt fimmibundlefor the group j
isone with no distortion --theinplicit marginal tax rate is zero. The
fifth condition says that if the self-selection constraintforgroup i is
binding, then at group j's bundle, MR& lies between the marginal rate of
transformation and MRS1. The marginal rate of transformation (=1)can be
eitherlargerorsmaller than the tMRS' •
Proof:
(i) Consider the no tax situation. The budget constraint of group i is
C- andthe optinialchoice (Crn, y) satisfies C =y10fr
monotonicityof V'-(Ci, y1). If V'(C3, yJ) =V1(C1,y-)V1°,thenC1y1
andC3y3 nustholdwith strict inequality in the second unless (C3, Y3) =
(C1,y) =(C10,Y°). This latter possibility can occur only when9
V1(C1,y1)=V1°andNRS1(C10,yin)=NF3(C1°yO) =1.Disregardingthis
special case, N(C1 -y)+ N(CJ -yi> 0 trust hold, violating the resource
balance constraint. (See Figure 1).
(ii)The no taxutilities(Vao, V'°) arefeasible and mist lieon the
constrained Pareto frontier. It is impossible to raise both types''welfare
since nodistortions exist. There trustexistsai forwhichV1(a0)
=V10
i =a,b. Hence, foranyother a, either Va(a),a(a) or Vb(a)
Frc*n (i), the group whose utility is at least at the no tax level cannot have
its self—selection constraint bind. It is thus impossible to have self-
select ion constraints binding for both groups.
(iii) Rewrite the resource constraint as Na(Ca -Ya)+ -b)<
and let L(ct, y) be the value of the objective function of (P1) at the opt1m'
Then, frcin the envelope theorn, differentiating L around y =0,L/ay =
Forany y > 0, the extra resources can always be given to the groups whose
self-selection constraint is not binding without any of the constraints being
violated. This raises the value of the objective function, showing
o.8
(iv)Assure=0and the self-selection constraint for group i holds
with strict inequality. IfMR& (C3(ct), yJ(a)) > 1, then, for small 6,
V3(C3(ct) —5,Y3(ct) -6)> V3 (C3 (a), Y3(a)) and V1(C3(a) —6,Y3(a) —6)<
will hold. Since resource balance continues to hold, the bundle (C3(ct) -6,
yJ (a) -(5)yields a higher value for the objective function. Similarly, if
MRS (C3 (a), Y3(a)) < 1, (C3(ct) + 6, Y3(a)+ 6) yieldsa higher value of the
objective function. (See Figure 2). If=0but the self-selection
constraint holds with equality, then fran (ii),=0trusthold.The first
order conditions immEdiately yield the result since ternE fran neither
self-selection constraint enter.10
MRS(C3(),yJ())<1,(C() +, Y(a)+)yields a higher value of the
objective function.(Seefigure 2). If Ai= 0but the self-selection
constraint holds withequality,thenfran (ii),A1 =0trust hold. The first
order conditions inirediately yield the result since terms from neither
self-selection constraint enter.
(v)AssunEXa
>0so thatfran (ii),Ab =0trusthold.The first order
conditions with respect to andYbare:
(1 -c)NbV(cb,yb) xV(C, yb) - = 0 (1)
(1 -c)NbV(Cb, yb) -xV(C,yb) +iNb
=0 (2)







Yb)[1 -sb(cb,Yb)]=A V(Cb,Yb)[1-4fa(Cbyb)] c ac (4)
MdingAaV(Cb yb)b(cb Yb)to both sides of (4), combiningterms,and
substituting (1) yields
-b(CbYb)]=A Va(Cb,Yb)[sb(cb, b) -a(CbYb)] ac (5)




>0,similarmanipulation of the first order conditions for Caand111a
shows the required results. Q.E.D.11
Requiringtaxes to raise net revenue does notchange significantly any of the
results. In Theorsm 11(i), instead ofusing the no tax situation as a
benchmark, the situation with a luTps.mi tax equal to the per capita share of
net required revenue can be used and allthe results follow.
(2) If the "single crossing"assuaption is made, as in Stiglitz [l982aJ
due to different abilities, MRSa < holdsat all (C, Y) bundles. Thus,part
(v)siuplifies to Aa >0inplies a(Cb(a) <gb(b()Yb(cs)) <1and
>0inplies 1 <NRSa(Ca(CL)),Ya(a)) <5b((5(a)ya(a))
(3) The intuition behindpart Cv) can be givenbyarguntssimilar to
the proof of part(iv).AssureA> 0andthat gb(b yb) <J<5ab yb)
Then,at least forsmall'S >0,if the bundle(d',Yb)ischangedto
Cd' +cS,+'S)resce balance continues tobe satisfied. A's self-
selectionconstraint holds with strict inequality, andB's welfarerises
yielding a Pareto improvanent. (See Figure 3).If b(d' yb) <a(Cb Yb)
1or if 1 <MRSa(d', Yb) <MRSb(d),Yb),thenmving (d',Yb)along A's
indifference curve below the 450linethrough (d',Ybleaves the self-
selection constraint for A holding withequality, raises B's utility, and
yields extra resources which can begiven to A to yield a Pareto improvement.
(See Figure 4).
(4) Along the Pareto frontier, thereare regions in which each self-
selection constraint binds. Even if thet groups differ only because of
ability differences, it cannot be assuid that theself-selection constraint
of the able will bind. Atsa points on the frontier, little redistribution
is done and neither binds. At others, theredistribution is fran the unable
to the able, so the self-selection constraint ofthe unable binds.
(5) Our characterization of the optimaltaxes permits canparisons between
the utility possibility frontiers (UPF) ofthe constrained problem and the full12
information probln (with no self-selectionconstraints). Ifneitherself-
selection constraint binds, then the tIJPF'scoincide. If one binds, then the
constrained UPF lies strictly below thefull-information one. With the
additional assumption that consumptionand leisure are normal for both classes,
-thethree regions of the UPF (neither constraintbinds, the constraint on A
binds, the constraint on B binds) areconnected seIEnts. (See Figure 5).
Corollary I: Under assumptions (Al)-(A3)and normality of consumption and
leisure, if a self-selection constraintbinds at a point on the 13FF then that
constraint binds at all points on the 13FFwith lower utility for that class.
The UPF has three seients: first, oneself-selection constraint binds; then,
neither binds (this includes the no-tax point);lastly, the other self-
selection constraint binds.
Proof: Consider a solution to (P1) for son asuch that Xa> 0. Denote this
solution as (Ct,'4, C, 4)whereVa(C,'4) =Va(C,4)and,fran Theorn
11(i), 14)< \7LOFran TheornI(v), 4)1.Let (C, 4)be
the bundlesuch thatVb(C, 4)= Vb(C,4)andb( 4)
= 1Then (44)
isthebundlewhich minimizes-'f"subjectto Vb(Cb,b) =vb((v1)
strictconcavity,it thenfollows thatC -4 < C-4. Therefore,
Va4, 4)> Va4,4)niisthold.If not,and Va4, 4)Va(C,4),then
the bundle (Ct, '14,C,4)xildsatisfy self-selection for both types and,
as canpared to (C,'4,C,'4)wouldgive both types the s utilitybut
'would use less net resources.Thiswould contradictthe assunption that
'4,c,4)ison the constrained 11FF.
AssuI that the resultisfalse so that there existsasolution for saie
othera, (C, '4,C,'4)whichis on the constrained 13FF at a 1ocr utilityfor
A and at 'which neither self-selectionconstraint binds. That is, asswe (i)13
4)
= ) >) 4,(ii) 4)
> 4), and(iii)MRSa(C, Y) =b(cb4)= 1.Fran theseassunptions, it follows
that C and 44 cannotbothhold. If both held, then
Va(C, 4)
Va(C,4)andhence,since Va(C, 4)> Va(C,4)wasshown above, Va(C, 4)
Va(C,4)whichcontradicts (i). Therefore,either <or4> 4 uust
hold.Since, fran (ii) and (iii),
MRSb(C,4)= b(cb
4)andVb(C, 4)<
Vb(c,4),thefirst inequality wouldimply that consiixptjon is inferiorand
thesecond that leisure isinferior. In eithercase, a contradiction arises
fran asstnriing the resultis false.
Q.E.D.
(6)In the coristraj.nproblem, the self-selectionconstraints imply
minini utility levels foreach group, while in the fullinformation problem,
utilityfor a group can bepusheddown to V'(O, K').Thus the utility
possibility frontieris truncated at higherutility levels. For example,
supposethe classes differonly in ability withWa >wb.For anyY>0,
Va(C,Y) >Vb(C,Y) since A's need to wor1lessto earn tFie saneincon.
Va(Ca, Ya) >Vb(Cb,Yb) since Va(Ca, Ya)Vb(Cb, Yb)<Va(Cb,Yb)violates
A'sself-selection constraint.Thus,A niistalwaysachieve nireutilitythan
B. Thisrins true if the problem isfornulated as maximizing V1subject to
V3 being not lessthan a target level, andvarying thetarget tomap out the
utility possibility frontier. At lowenough target levels, thetarget
constraint will not bind.
(7) The ordering of MRS'Sat the distorted bundle, (C3, Y3)if >0,
has an interpretation intermaof taxes. If thegroup desiring to nTtmic (i)
has the steeper indifferencecurve through j 's bundle, thengroup j is
subsidized cxi the margin. If ihas the flatter indifferencecurve through j 's
bundle, group j is taxed on themargin.14
B.Randan Taxation
The desirability of randanizatiOflin optimal taxation ni,dels, or in
principal-agent uodels in general,has been studied by Weiss [1976], Stiglitz
[1982a1, Fellingham, Kn, andNeinan [1984], and Arnott and Stiglitz[1985].
(A related problan is thatof designing auctions; Naskin and Riley[19841 have
established the desirability of randanizatiOflof payoffs in optimal auctions.)
The results in this section generalizethose in Stiglitz [1982a]. Therandc*n
action by the govermnt takes placeafter individuals reveal their typebut
before they decide their levels ofeffort. The govermnt COnStIUCtS t
lotteries of tax schedules, oneintended for individuals in group Aand one for
those in group B. Each individual nustdecide 'which lottery to participatein.
Then, at randan, a tax scheduleis assigned to the individual.The indivicb1,
given his tax schedule,decides cxi the anmt of inccxie to produce.Since the
individual has already declared his type, everyschedule can be constructed to
allow only one (C, Y) bundle to be chosen,even if the individual has
misrevealed his type. Thus, each lottery canbe viewed as a lottery over
different (C, Y) bundles -onefor each possible tax schedule that maybe drawn.
Randanization before the effort decisioncannot do rse than ranckiiriza-
don after the effort decision.Assune the randanizatiOti occsafter the
effort decision. In all outcarEs,the individual produces the sSnE pre-tax
incale but conslxnption differs depending uponthe tax charged. This, at the
revelation stage, each lottery canbe viewed as over (C, Y) bundles inwhich Y
is fixed and C differs. Suchlotteries remain feasible 'èien the inccxie
decision is made after randcinizatiOn but,in that case, other bundles with
different Y's also are feasible. Hence,randani.zatiOfl after the incalE
decision, yields a smaller feasibleset for the goverrtnt and maybe
suboptimal.915
onthe other hand, randomization before revelation cannot inrove on
randomization after revelation. In such circumstances, the govertnt
randomly assigns tax schedules to individuals without knowing their type.
After receiving a schedule, an individual faces no further uncertainty. Each
schedule the goverrixnt randomizes over can be treated as a pair of (C, Y)
bundles, one for each type. When the govermnt's probln is trarisfornEd to
choosing pairs of (C, Y) bundles, then each pair corresponding to one tax
schedule nust satisfy the self-selection constraints for each type. When the
randomization occurs after revelation, only one self-selection constraint over
the expected utilities arises. Although the bundles under prerevelation
randainess will satisfy this expected constraint, it is clearly weaker and
hence the prerevelatiori ranckTlness may be suboptim1 10
Tospecify formally the gaverrmnt 'soptmi ation with the possibility of
randan taxation, consider the lotteries to be offered to the tgroups A and
B.Each group will be offered aset of bundles and a probability for each
bundle in the set. The lotteries thus areL1( (C, Y), ir), i =a,b, and
h =1,...,k(i) wherek(i) isSaiE finite nuiber. The goverriint can choose
both the bundles and the probabilities in each lottery. The one period
maximization prthln withrandomization(P11) is then:
(P11)ka)( ah)+ (1 -c:t),kfb) ybh ah=l h=1
St.F,rihvi(ci1,ylh) jhvi(cih yJh) i.=a,b,




iT = 1,i =a,b,nih0, i =a,b andh=1,...,k(i)
h=1
i=a,b,h=1,...,k(i)
0 C M',i=a,b, h =1,...,k(i)
Asin(P1), a is aweight which can be varied to find the entire Pareto
frontier, A and iarethe niiltipliers on the self-selection and resource
constraints. The upper bounds M1 onbound the feasible
In prob1n (P11), the objective function and constraints incorporate ex
ante expected values. For the self-selection constraints and the govermnt' s
objective function this is reasonable. The goverrnElt nx.ist design the tax
SchaTE and theindividuals niistdecide which type to declare before realization.
It is therefore of no consequence if,expost, saneone prefers the bundle
achieved bysoneofthe othertype. Heier, production ocs after the
realizationof the randan process. If the expost realization has total
consunptiongreater than inccxne,it is not feasible even though expected
consunption equaled expected incane. Forthe constraintsin(P11), thiscan
clearly occur. If sarecthexceedsNaKa + NbKb (maxinun total production), even
if itariseswith very &nall probability, the outcaie is not feasible when this
bundle arises. Such ex post violations of feasibility can clearly occur even if
the M1 are set to restrict all C''tobe less than NaKa +l2
Onejustification for the constraint is ifthegovernnnt places one tax
function for each individual of a particular type into an urn and the
individuals draw without replacIEnt. Then the ex ante expected net resce
use of an individual is achieved exactly ex post by the group. Hence the
constraint in (P11)isappropriate. An alternative justification of the
constraint in(P11) is thateach individual ofa revealedtyped draws a tax
schedule at randan fran the same distribution. As the nunber ofindividuals17
gets large, the distribution of expost resource balance will always havevalues
violating the constraint. Howaver, thelaw of large numbersimplies that the
per capita violation of the constraintgoes to zero. Thus if the consunptjon
vectors are reduced by even anarbitrarily small ,theprobability that the
constraint is satisfiedgoes to 1 as the population grows. Hence,the solution
to (P11) can be viewed asan c-equilThrit in this case. Sincethe
self-selection constraintsholding with equality alreadyimplythatthe solution
to (P11) is an c-equilibriun,this is not a real restriction.
To sImmn-ize, there existrandomization procedures under whichthe resource
constraintin(P11) is appropriate. Withoutspecifying it in detail, such a
procedure is assuned to be utilizedby the goverrm1t. Care trust betaken,
since for other procedures, theforrriilition in (P11) isinappropriate.
Under allowable procedures,a solution to (P11) always exists.
___________ a*h*h* Theoran III: Forevery a, there exists a pair of lotteries L((C,r ), * * b*h* h* * * h=1, .. k(a) and L h=1,. ..,k(b)which solve (P11).
Proof: As inTheornI, the constraint setis nonnpty sincefeasible bundles
in (P1) can betreatedas degenerate lotteries. Theconstraint set is closed
and all variables(1rh, cth,Yth)are bounded. Hence, the constraintset is
cciipact. The continuous objective function thenattains a maxinun on the
noneipty cc*ipact constraint set.
Q.E.D.
The optiiml lotteries which solve(P11) can becharacterizedina similar
manner tothe nonrandan optiniii.As in the previous section, V°,i=a,b,
arethe utilitiesin theno tax situation,
((Cth(cz), Yth(a)),
lrth(a)), i=a,b, h=1,. .,k*(i), arethe optim1 lotteriesas a function of a,arid
(a) h(a)V1(Cth(a) Y(a)),ia, b, -optil ected
utilitiesachievedasfunctions of a.18
Theorn IV: Thesolutionto (P11) satisfiesthe followingproperties





.hvi(CJh(), ih) thenEV (a)>
h=1
k(i)
,rth(a)VJ(C (ci),Y(a)), i =a,b, and ji.
h=1
(iii) >0.
(iv) Ifi's self-selection constraint does not bind,then an optimal solution
existswithk(j)=1andMR&(C(a), 'f1(a)) =1, i=a, b, andji.
(v)For i=a,b, and ji, if >0thenan optimal solution existswith
k(j)3 andat each h =1,...,k(j), either
1 <NR&(C3FI(a), ih) <NRS1(CJh(a),yJh(a))
IYIRS1(CJh(ct),yh)<NR&(C'(ct),jh) <1, or
NRS1(CJh(a),yjh()) =MR&(C(a), .]h()) =1.
Proof:See the Appendix.
Conditions (i) -(iii)of Theorn IV are essentially the sama asthose of Theoran
II with the utilities replaced by expectedutilities. Condition (iv) states
that if theself-selectionconstraint of group iisnot binding then itis
desirable to have no randanizatiofl for group jand,as in Theorn II,thereis
no distortionary taxation at thisbundle. Condition (v) states that there is no
gain to having randcinization over nxrethan three bundles and, if randanization
isovergroup j'sbundles,then.at each of thosebundlesthe NRS1, FIR& and
NRT(=1) niist relate to each other in the waysspecified in condition (v) of
Theorn II. That is, at each(CJh, Jh)NR& trustlie between MRS1 and 1.The19
possibility that MRS1 =NRS=1at one of the bundles cannot be ruled out.
Note it is possible to raridanize with MRS1 and MR& greater than 1 at sane
bundles and less than 1 at others. Single crossing iioses the s relation
bet MRS1 arid MR& at all bundles in the lottery.
In the solution to (P11), at nost one nondegenerate lottery is needed and
randanization over nire than three bundles is unnecessary. It has not been
shown that either group will face a nondegenerate lottery. First order
conditions are of little use for showing that a nondegenerate lottery exists or
for finding the randan solution, because the nonrandcni solution to (P1)
satisfies the first order conditions for (P11). To see this, denote the
nonrandan solution as a lottery over k(i) bundles where each bundle is identical
to the nonrandan bundle solving (P1). First order conditions with respect to
are trivially satisfied and those with respect to Cth andreduce to
those in (P1). Hence, a nondegenerate randan solution exists only when nultiple
solutions to the first order conditions exist, with the extra solutions
asyninetric (and not readily apparent). Hver, since the self-selection
constraints involve the difference in utilities and therefore do not define
convex sets, nnltiple solutions are possible. Theorn V shows that for any pair
of indifference maps satisfying assunptions (Al) -(Aill),sane allowable
transformation exists under which a randcxn solution is desirable. Maskin and
Riley [1980] show a similar result with a continwin of abilities for t1 special
case of preferences which are additive in consution and labor and linear in
consunpticxi.
Theorn V: Consider any V1 and V3 satisfying assuxption (Al)-(A3) and any a
such that A> 0, i =a,b. Then there exists sane concavification of V1 such
that k(j) >1holds in the solution to (P11), whether or not V3 is similarly
transfonned. Proof: See the Appendix.20
In Theoran V, only the utility function of individuals in group i is
transforned. However, transforming the utility of individuals in group jas
well does not change the result since the randcxnizatiori involves bundles over
which jisindifferent. Hence, the result also applies to situations in which
the t groups have the sama utility functions but differ inability.See
Figure 6 for an illustration of the construction.
The construction in the proof den,nstrates clearly how the nonconvexity
of the self-selection constraints can induce randcii ation. If group jhas
the randan bundle, then the transformation makes group i 's utility function
nxre concave and thus reduces the desirability of j'slottery to individuals
in group i. This weakens i's self-selection constraint and allows for
adjusnts which raise j'sexpected utility. Having the initial randaniza-
tion over tv bundles which are chosen to be indifferent to the optiiiii
nonrandctn bundle given to jisa convenient way to dalDristrate that an
iinprovent over the solution in (P1) exists. This particular randcinization
has a special property --itdoes not violate horizontal equity defined as
identical agents having equal utilities even if they have different budget
sets. All type j's receive equal utility, although with different consuition
bundles. The randanization only causes utilities to be stochastic for type
i's who nrimic type j's. Jhile this may not be the optimal randanization, it
rains feasible even when ex post horizontal equity is required..
Theoren V shows that the desirability of randanization cannot be ruled
out frcin indifference maps since randanizaticxi can arise for essentially any
indifference maps under sai transformation. It is orth noting hever, that
the shape of the indifference map does have sai effect on whether randaniza-
tion is desirable. The next theoran gives a necessary and sufficient
conditn for local randcinization which depends in part on the curvature of21
indifferencecurves. As str Aa>0inthe solution to (P1) so thatthe
marginal tax rateis not zero at (Cb, Yb).LetH1be the Hessianofthe
utility function of type i at (Cb, Yb).
TheoranVI: Assun X> 0 in the solution to (P1) and consider any
probability triple 11, 2' 113).atleastt of'which arepositivearid
TI1++113 =1.There exists s local randanjzation with these
probabilities around the nonrandcxn solution to (P1) 'which improves on that




whereqt is the transposeof q. Proof: See the Appendix
Theexpression in(6) depends uponproperties of the indifferencemap though
theMRS1(Cl), Yb)terREand theqHlqttermswhich dependuponboththe
curvatureof indifference curves and the transformation of utility.
As a corollary, it follows that, if preferences of A' s and B's are
similar,then local randcxrLzation will notbedesirable. Assl.mE the utility
functions belongtoa familyparanEterizedby P, Va(C, and(Vb(C, ''b'
CorollaryII: ASSURE that preferences are related such that at all P ='a
=
Va(C,Y, P) =F(V1'(C,Y, F)). Then, forab' randclm7atiofl is
desirableunless F is sufficiently concave. Proof: See the Appendix.
A specialcaseof this result is t classes with identical preferencesbut
different abilities.If the abilities are close to each other, no
randanization is desirable regardless of which group the redistribution
favors.13Both Theorn V and Corollary II showthat concavifyingutility22
makesrandanization desirable. Theoren Vconcernsthe degree ofconcavityof
eachutility function separately, while Corollary II involves the concavity of
oneutility functionrelative to the other. For a n1es1b'
if bothfunctions
undergo thesame transformation, no local randanizationwillbe desirable.
TheornV daixnstrates that,if a b'
randctiizationwillbe desirable if
theccmix,ri transformation isextr enough. Thus, this randanizationlaist be
anonlocal randanization of bundles offered a group in a lottery.
In order to see that the condition of TheoranVI can be satisfied,
consider a special case of all individuals having identical additiveutility
functions over consuition andlabor with the groups differing onlyin ability.
CorollaryIII: Considerthe utility functions V1 (C, Y) =*(C) -Y (Y/w),
i=a,b, where theareability parameters with 0 <w <WasTosatisfy
concavityofV1, ijiisconcaveand yconvex.Let L1 =Y/w.
(A) Assume the self-selection constraint forgroupA is binding.
(i)No randanizationis desirableifLy"(L)/y"(L)-2,at all L.
(ii) Consideranyprobabilities 112, 113)withat least to positive
and with 111 +112 + 113= 1.There exists sare local randanization
with theseprobabilities aroundthe nonrandan optinuof(P1) which




(B) Assure the self-selection constraint forgroupB is binding:
(i) No randanization is desirable if Ly"(L)/y"(L)-2, at all L.
(ii) Consider anyprobabilities(if1, ira, 113)withatleast t positive
and with in+ + 113 = 1.There exists sai local randanization
with these probabilities around the nonrandan optinhiTi of (P1) which
improves on thenonrandansolution if f:23
yI(Ya/wb) YlI(Ya/W)
8 ,2b(Ca ya) -1)WaZ(NRSa(Ca, ) -1)
Proof: See the Appendix.
Consider the condition in A(ii).SinceWa>and 1 -RSa(Cb,b) >
1sb(cbyb)>0,the denanjnator oftheLHS exceeds that ofthe RHS in
(7).Hence, y"(Yb/w) nxist exceed y"(Yb/wb)by a sufficient anount for this
condition to be satisfied. Since Yb/Wa<
Y"/Wb,this can be satisfied by a
sufficiently negative value of y". A sufficientcondition for (7) to be
satisfied is that the derivatji of-y"(Y/w) /[w2(1 -MRS)Iwithrespect to w be
positive. Taking this derivativeyields the following sufficient condition
for the desirability of localraridcxnization with any probabilities whichis
stricter than thenecessary condition in A(i) of Theoran VI:
L(y"(L)/y"(L) <- 2-[y'(L)+ y"(L)}/[w'(C)-y'(L)J (9)
wherewi'(C) -y'(L)=w(C)(1-NRS(Cb,Yb))> 0.A similar calculationfor
B(ii)yields (9)withthe inequality reversed asa sufficient condition for
local randaijzation whenAb >0.Note that wçb'(C) -y'(C)<0when Ab >0so
that this is stricter than thenecessary condition B(i).
Condjtion (Ai) and (Bi), whichare niituallyexclusive unless
=-2,are sufficient conditions for no randanizationto be
desirable. Thus, randanjzatjon is desirablenowhere cxi the IJPF if
Lv"CL)/y" (L) =2.14F'urthernore,ranckinization cannot be desirable both
with >0and >0unlessLy'"(L)/y"(L) + 2 changes sign along the TJPFas
labor supply changes. Since sufficientconditions for local randmf 7ti
suchas (7) and (8) are opposite in sign, randaiiizationis desirable sacthere
on the UPF, for many allowabley(.)functions.1524
III.Taxation ina1hltiperiod MDdel
A. AssuiiptioflS
The trodel is an N period repetitionof the one period orld of section II
(N may be finite or infinite).1 classes exist and each individual belongs
to the sau class across periods.The nuthers in each group rin constant
over tine. Preferences overinca1 and consunptiOfl within each periodsatisfy
(Al) -(A3)and are identical acrossperiods.Lifetin utility is the present
discounted value of the utility in the M periods.Individuals in both classes
have the sane discount factor denoted p.DenotingC1=(Ci,... ,C) andY1 =
(Y,..
.,Y)asthe vectors of lifetijieconsunption and inc forclass i and
V1(C1, Y1) as thelifetinE utility function for class i,then
N
V1(C1,Y) = ptV1(C, Y), i =a,b (10)
t=1
It follows that if there is randcxnizatiorl,with the individuals offered
lotteriesoverlifetine inccze-constnhlptiofl vectors, thenthis lottery can be
deccxnposed into separate lotteriesineachperiod and expected lifetinE
utility equals the presentdiscounted value of the expected utilitiesinthe
different periods.
Individuals are unable to save or to borrow acrossperiods and thus face
Nseparatebudget constraints. This assutptiotlis made to focus purely on the
role of information transfer across periodsinaffectingtaxation witlx,ut
ca,licating the analysis with possibilityofalthor interest taxation. In
the first period, every individualfaces the staxfunction T1 (Y1) since
the governneflt has no basis uponwhich to distinguish individii1s. TIre-
after, thegoverriintcan recall the inccilEs reportedinprevious periodsand
can condition the taxfunctions on previous periods' incctte.Thus, the tax25
functionin period t>1,is writtenasTt(YtIY1, ... Takingthe
sequence of tax functions as given, each individual chooses lifetinE
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Thesolution gives 1ifetin consulçtion and incalE vectors as functions of the
vector of tax functions C1 (T1,. ..,'In),Y1 (T1,... ,
Giventhe choices by individuals in each class and subject to budget
balance requireients, the governnent chooses the set of tax functions to
achieve its inax:inum. Asinthe one period iiodel, the decision on the choice
of tax functions can be transfornd into choice of lifetin consuulption inccxr
vectors for each class with (Ca, ) and (Cb,sustainable by a systen of
tax functions if and only if lifetinE self-selection constraints are satisfied
for each class. There is only one lifetin constraint for each class and riot
period by period self-selection constraints. In the first period, individuals
will base their decisions whether or not to reveal their type through their
choice of incai on the entire lifetinE consequences that follow. If
individuals do reveal in the first period, the goverrnt knows thereafter who
they are and can prevent then fran acting as if they belonged to a different
class. After revelation through their first period choices, the second and
later period tax functions can incorporate a large penalty if any other bundle
is chosen than the one the governnEnt desires then tochoose.For exanpie, a
taxfunctionoftheforinT(Y)=Y,Y<?,T(Y)=Y+K-?,Y?,willinduce
the individual to produce incaxe of?, raises revenue of K, for any K ?,and26
allowsthe indivichial to consi C =Y-T(Y)=I-K.After the first period
revelation, the individuals in later periods no longer find the bundleof the
other group to be feasible. Hence, a self-selection constraint no longer
constrains the goverrnts' choices. Because the goverrmEnt has the ability
to cainiit itself, and separation is desirable in a single period problem
(Theorem II), separation will occur in every period.
T separate budget balance requirenEnts for the goverEnt are
considered. One possibility is that the goverritent has a single nultiperiod
N
budgetconstraintti [N Tt + NbT I0, whereTisthe tax revenue aa 1
raised from group i in period t and cS is the discount factor faced by the
governmEnt. Alternatively, the governmEnt could be required tobalance its
budget separatelyin each periodwith NaT+NbT 0,t=1,...,M.Clearly,
the secondis a tighter constrainton the goverrmmnt' schoices. It reflects
uxrecloselythegoalof consideringpure information transfer beten periods
and isconsistentwith theno savingassimiption forindividuals.On theother
hand, thesingle ntiltiperiodconstraint isjustifiableifthe governmEnthas
accessto possibilities not available to individualssuch asa storage
technologyfeasible onlyon a large scale or access to a rld marketclosed
to trade by individuals.
ThegovernmEntmaximizes thepresent discounted valueofa weighted sum
ofutilities in each period wherethe weights aand (1-a)are arbitrary and
can varyto changethe distribution beten the groups but are constant over
tima.The governmant'sdiscountfactor 6 need not equal that ofindividw1s.
Wnen they areequal (s= p),the govenmnt' smaximization correspondsto
finding thenultiperiodParetofrontier as a varies fran 0 to 1. when they
differ(6p),the problem is no longer aPareto problem since the governmEnt
does notrespect individuals'intertnporalpreferences. .Jhile nuch
literature analyzeswhy privateandsocialdiscount rates coulddiffer, these27
donot constitute the maj or reasons forallowing Sp in this paper. The
major focus is on the case of equal discount rates.Allowing than to differ
gives rise to a case which serves as a useful benchmarkfor canparison when
discussing the uses of information in the optimal taxstructure. The use of
information across periods when 6 =pis nuch less systanatic than when 6p.
With randcinization not available to thegovertnt, r_ consider t
maximization problans, (Pilla) and (P11Th),depending upon which budget
constraint isused.For the single nultiperiod constraint theproblan is:
(Plila) Max6t[aNaVa(C, Y) + (1 -a)NbVb(C,Y)]
M .. .
s.t.
pt_l[V1(C, Y) -V1(C,Y)]0, i =a,b, ji
t=1
ti
6•1[N(C - +Kb(C - 0
OYK1, i=a,b, t=1,...,M
C0, i=a,b,
For the separate constraints on eachperiod, the problan is identical except
that the constraint t1[Na(C-Y)÷ Nb(C-Y)0isreplaced by:
(P11Th)Na(C -Y)+ Nb(C -Y)0,t=
TheLagrange nxiltipliers on the self-selection constraintsare still denoted
by Aa and Ab aitluigh their values will differ betweenproblans (Pilla) and
(P11Th). The Lagrange nultiplier on the singlebudget balance constraint in
(Pilla) is denoted by iwhilet=1,... ,Mdenote the nultipliers on each
period's budget balance constraint in (P11Th).
Section B presents the case of 6 =pand section C the case of 6p.28
B.Optimal Taxation 'Jhen 6
Characterization theorems of the optimalsolution in (Pilla) similar to
Theorems II and IV for (P1) and (P11)continue to hold. Let C(ci) and Y),
t =a,b, and t =1,.. ,M,be the solutions to(Plila)as functions of .
Vlt(a)denotesthe optimal utilityin periodt of individuals in class ifor
(Plila).V10,i=a,b, againdenotesone period utility with no taxes.
TheoremVII: Theoptimalsolutionto (Plila) satisfies the following
properties:
(i)Ifpt_lV1(ct) vioLpt_1 thenpt_lV1(C(c),yJ()) <pt_l1t(ç),
i=a,b andji.
N . N . . . M
(ii)1:f t_lVlt(a)= pt_lV1(C(a), y3()) )pt_1vJt()>
t=1 t=1 t=1
N
ptlVJ(C(), Y(cx)), i =a,b andji.
t=1
(iii) ii> 0









MRS'(C(ct), Y(ci))MR&(C(ct), Y(ci)) =
1
Proof:See the Appendix.29
Franpart (v) it follows that even if information is utilized, if
distortions exist in the first period then they persist in future periods.
Thus, information learned cannot be fully used to uL,ve to a first best result
after the first period. The govermnt nust ccmnit itself to use information
only to a limited extent.
Theorn VII does not show that the goverrilEnt will use any information
gained in the first period to affect later period taxes. In fact, a s inpie
repetition of the one period nonrandan solution to (P1) satisfies all the first
order conditions in (Pilla). Hver, despite the apparent synhietry of the
first order conditions, nultiple asynmatric solutions may arise in the form of
nonstationarity of the optimal consunption-incai vectors. Such nonstationary
solutions arise fran the sama nonconvexity of the self-selection constraints
that gives rise to randan solutions in the one period probln. In fact, the
following theor show that there is an exact analo beten existence of a





utilityachieved byeach group overits lifetiix. Let the normalized utility
possibility frontier be the utility possibility frontier in average utilities.
Theorn VIII: Assuma p= 62/3 and M =. Thenforevery ci,there exists a
solution to (Pilla). This solution involves nonstationarity iff k(i) >1,
i =aor b, in (P11). In addition, the normalized Pareto frontier arising in
(Plila)isidentical to that in (P11).Proof:See the Appendix.
Givenan infinitehorizon and a large enough discount factor, any one
period randan solution can be exactly duplicated by a nonstatiaiary solution.
The circuxistances in Theorn V and VI under which randanization will arise are
thus sufficient for nonstationsry solutions. Even if M is finite or 6 is
1l, nonstationarity can arise.30
TheoremIX: If tS= p andif M is finite or ó <2/3,then the normalized Pareto
frontier for (Pilla) y be interior to that for (P11). For any ,asolution
willinvolve nonstationarityonly ifk(i) >i,i =aor b in (P11). For S2/3,
there exists a sufficiently large finite M such that nonstationarity in a solution
to(Pilla) arises iff k(i)>1,i =aor b in (P11). Proof:See the Appendix.
Inmanycases,the result for finite N or tS< 2/3maybe stronger. As
shown in Theorem VI, 'when son local randanization inproves on the nonraridom
solution, then there exists a randanization with any probabilities in the
probability siuplex which iuproves on the nonrandan solution. In this case,
even though the optinal solution to (P11) cannot be duplicated, a nonstationary
solution to (Pilla) exists iff a local nonrandan solution exists in (P11).
Problem (P11th) is the case of pure information transfer across periods
since neither the goverriInt nor individuals can borroc or save. It is not
possible to duplicate the one period randan solution by nonstationarity unless
randanization was over bundles with C-= (N/N) (C3 -Y3),h =1,2, 3.
Thisis not always true as shown by the exan,le in Theorem VI where only inca
is randcxn. Nevertheless, nonstationarity may still arise in (P11th) as long as
randanization arises in (P11Th). The Appendix contains a characterization of
the solution to (P11Th) as Theorem Al.
The only significant difference between the results for (P11th) and those
for (PlIla) is that it cannot be shown that the sane bundle is given in every
period to group jifgroup i's self-selection constraint is not binding.
However, any nonstationarity for group jisover bundles with no distortion.
Theorem X: Ifp= d,nonstationarity is possible in the solution to (P11th)
and arises only ifk(i) >1,i =aor b, in (P11).Thenormalized Pareto
frontierfound in (P11th) is generally interior to that in (Plila) whenever
the solution to (Plila) involves nonstationarity. Proof: See the Appendix.31
If randcirness withinperiods is permitted as llas nonstationarity of
the tax schedules, clearly, thegoverruint can do as l1 as in the solution
to (P11). This istrue for finite M andany discount rate. Only if randc]jl
solutions are used for (P11) willeither randan ornonstationary solutions be
used in the niilti-perjodproblan, regardless of whether thebudget constraint
is a single one or aperiod-by-perjj one. Allowing bothtypes of variation
leads to tailtiple optimalsolutions which canbine randanizationand
nonstationaz.ity in differentways.
C.pptiinal Taxationwhen 6p
Whenthe governmant and individualshave different discountrates,
5ysttjc ncxlstationarity arisesin the optinalsolution. To contrast with
the nonsysteitjcnonstationarity when 6 =, onlyresults for (Pilla) are
given. Similar results hold ifperiod-by-period budget balance isrequired or
if additional randcwjzatjonis allowed. Note that similarresults arise if
the t classes had differentprivate discount rates instead ofidentical
private rates different fran thegovertiirit's.
The first order conditjon in(Pilla) are:
r6tcNa + Aapt_i](aVa/aC)— Xbpt_i(Vb/aC)—
pót_lNa
=0, (ha) t =
+Aapt_h] (aVa/ay) —Apt(aVb/ya)





=0, (lie) t =1,.. . ,N
+
xbP](av1'/aY) -Xapt_l(3V/Y)+p6tl 0, (lid) t =1,...,M
When 6 >p,it follows franthese conditions that as tincreases, the
ecorKmy approaches the single period first best UPF forany values of Aa and32
Ab.This, of course, does not tranthatthenormalizedUPF based on average
utilitiesisthe first best.
TheornXI: Consider (Pilla) *ienS >pandM =. AssunEthat the utility
functions satisfy the conditionsthat lirn(Va/3C) /(aVb/9C)and
C+o
liI%(ava/ay)/(?)DIaY) are finite. Then,when Ab=0andAa>0,
K b (C, ) =1.Since NRSa ( C, Y) =1,forallt,as tgrows, the
optinhlit approaches theperiod-by-period Pareto frontier.
Proof: Given Ab =0,equations(ha) and (lib) yield NRSa(C, ?)
=1,for
all t.Divide equation (lie)b:r 6t_1(3Jb/acl)and (lid)by
(1 -)Nb
-A6)t [(f9C)I(avb/aCt)I- Nb/(vb/ac)=0, (12-a)
(1-
Nb- -pNb/(3vb19) = 0, (12b)
Sinceav1/aCisfinite for C >0and lifl(Va/C) /(aVb/aC)isfinite,
urnp(p/s)t_ [(/C)/(Va/aC)1 =0.Hence,shouldurn sup(aVb/aC)=
thenafter sara t, the left handside of (12a) ,uld be strictly positive
violating the first ordercondition. Thus, no Csequencegoes to zero,
guaranteeing that Urninf C>0. Similarly,frcxn (12b), Urn sup<Kb.
refore, Em(/6)t(/aCb) =Urn (p/)t1 (3/3) =0.








Note that the conditions on utilitygiven in this theorncanbe
satisfied by the utility functions in TheornVI withWa >wb.Given the
separability,(aVa/aC)/(aVb/ac) =1at all C. The maxiimri incareearned by
the able exceeds thatearnedby the unable Ka> Kb. Hence, evenif ay/aL goes
intoinfinityas L approaches it maxinun value at K11w1, since Kb/Wa<Ka,Wa
then 3Y(Kb/w)/ay and ljjn(DVa/ay)/(avb/ay)arefinite.
y+1c
Different discountratescausethegoverrunt andindividualsof type A
tohave difference preferences. Therefore,trade between th9nispossible.
The goverrxrnt places a higher valueon thefixturethan do individuals.
Hence, the govemlent canoffertyp. A individuaiahighercurrent utility and
lowerfuture utility'while doingthereverse for type B as canpared to the
solutionwhen d =p.Self-selection will continue to be satisfiedgiven the
value of p but social welfare rises. Tosee this, note that fran equation
(ha) and (hib), aVa/aC =aVa/aY
=b"a+
Aa(P/(5)t_lj..Hence, nrginal
utility of consunption rises over tinEindicating that consuTption declines.
As t goes to infinity, a3Va/aCgoes to .Forgroup B consuriptiori,
(1 —)aVb/aC)u+ a/N)(p/s)t_la/C),whichsinceurninf C >0,
mist at least eventually decline with Crising. As t goes to infinity,
(1 -a)(3Vb/C)goes to Thus,in the limit, the solution is notonly
Pareto optinial but it is first best in thesense of being the s as the
solution to the one period probln withoutself-selection constraints.
If< p, thetrade is still possible but tends togo in the opposite
direction. As t goes toinfinity,C goes to infinity and Y goes to zero
along apath with MRSa(C, Y) =1,atall t.ihis, A's utility rises over
Fran (lic), it followsthatCmist also go to infinity as t rises.
However, Y going either to 0 or to Kbcouldbe consistent with the first
order condition (lid). Whatever thespecific solution, in this case as whens
>p, thepaths of carnodities aridutilitiesnove systematically over tine and
do not vary solely to nthn-icrandariizatiorj.34
IV. Conclusions
These results indicate that when the governnentrespects individual
discount rates, only in a weak sensedoes the optimal tax sys tan incorporate
any informationabout individuals learned fran their responsesover tine.
First, if the goverrment is able torandanize in each period, then no benefit
is gained by keeping track of whatjndividuals have earned in past periods.A
lottery can be offered in each period,independent of other periods,
satisfying self-selection constraintsand yielding the best possible outccxre.
Second, if the govertent cannotranckxnize directly, then it can duplicate
ran&rnizatiOtl by intertanporal nonstationaritY.3uch nonstationaritY requires
that the governnent keep track ofindividuals' past behavior since, after the
first period, self-selection constraintsneed not be satisfied. Third, even
when the goverment nust keep track ofbehavior and uses this in future
periods, the information is notused systanatically to yield continued
increases in the governnent objectivefunction over tine. Instead, changes in
the weighted suni of utilities across periods occursonly as the govertiient
tries to mimic a one period randcin optimrun.If tax schedules mist vary over
tine in a particular iner, it is notbecause of the need to learn
individuals' abilities, but because utility ineach period mist be ordered
correctly to be consistent with lifetineutility constraints.
By contrast, 'when the governnentdiscounts at a different rate than
individuals, then there is systanatic changein the bundles given to
individuals. In the limit, the distortions maybe eliminated. This arises
because the different intertaporal preferencesof the govermnt and
individuals leaves roan for "trade" betweenthan. Over t:ine the differences
between the utilities of the groups grows larger.
The results in this paper show thatnonstationaritY over tine and
randanization within each period can substitutefor each other in the opti1'l35
intertnpora1incai tax. It is not clear which approach is preferable since
each has sr advantages.
First, theyarenot perfect substitutes. Even if the goverrlnQnt hasa
single intertanporal budget balance constraint, nonstationarity is guaranteed
to do as well as randanization only with iinfinitehorizon and a
sufficiently large discount factor. If the goverruent has a separate budget
constraint in each period, the optimal randanization cannot be canpietely
icated by intertrporal variability, so that randanization along with
nonstationarity would be needed to reach this Pareto frontier.
Second, political and administrative difficulties could prevent
inplaientation of either nethod. On one hand, the goverrinent may be reluctant
to incorporate randcinization explicitly in the tax code. This is especially
true since the optimal randanization requires individuals to declare their
type and then receive at randan a tax schedule before choosing their labor
supplies. The optimal randanization can generally not be iniplanented by
randcxn collection or eaforcannt after labor supply decisions. On the other
hand, intertanporal nonstatioriarity requires keeping track ofpast labor
supplydecisions to determine individuals' current tax paynents. Hocver,
this is simplified since the goverrnent needs only to recall each individual's
type as revealed by past decisions instead of relearning this each period as
isrequired by randanization.
Third, both ethically and to increase acceptance of the tax sys tan by
society, it is desirable that the systan be perceived as fair. A standard
notion of fairness is horizontal equity, that individuals in the sane
circinstances be treated the sane. Randcxnizatiori satisfies horizontal equity
ex ante but not ax post. Before the randctn selection, all individuals of the
sane type face the sane lottery. After receiving a randan draw of tax
functions, individuals of the sane type will be induced to choose bundles36
which need not yield the sama utility. Note, however, that suboptimal
randanization in which ex post horizontal equity is imposed may often still be
better than no randcxnization as the proof of Theorn V daionstrates. Inter-
tpora1 nonstationarity achieves horizontal equity both ex anteand ex post
in each period. Individuals of the s type are induced to choose the sara
bundles as each other in every period even though the choice varies over tinE.
Fourth, both procedures induce asynnEtries in the bundles chosen by
individuals of a type either within a period in an expected sense under
randaEizaticxi or over tine under noristationarity. With strictly concave
utility functions, individuals desire to reduce these asyimtries.Under
randonization, individuals might gain by purchasing insurance counteracting
the randamess in the tax systn. If such policies re forbidden, then
similar effects could be achieved by trades with other individuals of the sane
type. For the sane reason, under nonstationarity,individuals desire to
sncoth consuition and leisure over tinE by saving or borrowing. Saving or
insurance serves to counteract the weakening of self-selection constraints
which notivated asynixetry of bundles in the first place. 'fle ability to save
or buy insurance will be a factor in the decision to revealone' s type
truthfully. The choice between nonstationarity or randaxriess may depend upon
whether it is easier to prevent saving or insurance. If these are desirable
for other reasons or cannot be prevented, then the simple repetition of the
solution to (P1) may be the best feasible solution. However, the opposite
probløn arises if only symxetric solutions are allowed whenindividuals have
nonconvex opportunity sets. Indivitbv1s may desire randmiationof
consuiiption about their bundles to convexify budget sets. Thus, gaibling
might have to be inhibited by the govermEnt. Any naiconvex tax structure
nust account for additional markets whose use might be encouraged by the tax
structure.37
Footnotes
1.Guesnerie and Seade [1982] derived scxr resultswithout global single
crossing, but they assumed that MRS 's'werenot equal at the optimal
bundles. We only assume that tangencies donot lie on the no-tax budget
line and show that the MRS's are notequal at an optiim iii.
2.Thisrequiresan additionalassizptiori on U(C,L). Note thatMRS1 (C, Y) =
_1hJL(C,L1)IwUc(C,I)n.Ifa> bthenLa<Lb.The result holdsif
thedirect effect of the higherwage is not countered by the effects of a
lower L on the MRS. Differentiating -
[UL(C ,Y/w)/'wlJ (C ,Y/w) I with respect
tow yields dMRS(C,Y) /dw =(UL/WU)-(L/w)d(_tJL/UC) /dL. A sufficient
condition for dMRS(C,Y)/d <0is d(_UL/UC)/dL0 'which holds if Cis
not inferior. See Sadka [1976].
3.The schedule T(Y) need not be differentiable.In fact, it will generally
be nondifferentiable at the inccxlEs chosenby the t groups.
4. A lower ability class might be unableto produce the incam of a higher
ability class. Such bundles can be assignedarbitrarily low utilities.
5.The results are essentially unchanged iftaxes had to raise net revenue
aswallas redistributing across groups.
6.Other tax functions could yield thesane result as long as the slope of
the individual budget constraint isgreater than both MRS 's, for Y less
than Y1, and is smaller than both MRS's, for Ygreater than Y1.
7.Aself-selection constraint may hold withequality so that one of the
groups may be indifferent between the t bundles offered. The solution
requires that all individuals in thegroup choose the bundle aiimed at that
group. This can be achieved by assumiing that the goverrnt canassign
indifferent individuals to whichevergroup it desires. Given that the
goverment does not know to which group a particular individualbelongs,
this is not a reasonable assumption. An alternativeview is that the
solution to (P1) is really an c-equilibrium.Although it cannot itself
be achieved, a bundle arbitrarily close to thatsolutioncan be found38
whichsatisfies resource balance and which has the self-selection
constraint hold with strict inequality. If the self-selection
constraints taist hold with strict inequality, then there mayexist no
solution to the maximization prob1n.
8.This is true provided the group whose self-selection constraintdoes not
bind does nothaveits weight equal 0. However, if a =0then B's
self-selectionconstraintcannot bind since resources are being
transferredto B. Similarly, if a=1,then A'sself-selection
constraintcannot bind. Inaddition, thereisan implicit assumption
that the maximized value as a function of ydoesnot have an inflection
point at y= 0.Constraintqualification rules out such a possibility.
9.If ex ante randaiiLzation is not possible, then ex post randatiization
might still be desirable.
10. Again, ifpost revelation randarriess is not possible,the prerevelation
randamnessmay be desirable sinceit weakens the budget constraint of the
governnnt.Such prerevelation randarriess can be desirable if there are
nonconvexities in the utility possibility frontier (see Stiglitz
[1982a]).
11. In (P1), the bounds onY1 along with resource balance autcinaticallybound
C1. Here. bounds on C do not foll fran the expected resource
constraint since that constraint bounds the products 11.cih only.As
sara ir goes to zero, the corresponding Ccould be made arbitrarily
large. The M1 could be chosen sufficiently large tobound the feasible
set without affecting the solution.
12. To guarantee ex post resource balance for all realizationsof all randan
mechanisms, a stronger constraint nust be imposed:
N MaX[Cth -Y]+ N,, Nax[d)h -bh<0 (Fl) ah h
where the max's are over those bundles with nonzero probability.
Condition (Fl) says that, even ifall individualsreceive the bundle with
the largestdifferencebetween C and Y, rescebalancestillholds.39
For sai types of randcinization, (Fl) may be required. For exairple,
assuIE, in the lotteries, that one tax schedule (that is, one bundle) is
chosen for every individual of a type. The objective function arid
self-selection constraints are unaffected by the manner in which
randairizaticjn occurs. If (Fl) is violated, then there is clearly s
positive probability of assigning nore consulption than is available.
On the other hand, for many machanisms, (Fl) is far too restrictive. It
rules out balancing large corisuiiption to sai people frc*n a favorable
draw for them against low consumption to others of the sama type. This
can be achieved withxit violating the feasibility constraint ex post as
discussed in the text.
13. This result holds not just because little redistribution is desired with
similar abilities so that neither self-selection constraint binds. If
=0in (P1) and the A's are nore able, redistribution is carried out so
that A's self-selection constraint binds. Randaization will not improve
on this solution.
14. If y= K1lnL+ K2L, where K1 <0and 1(2 >0,then Ly"/y" =-2so that
randaiization will never occur.(y'> 0can be assumsd by the function
at small values of L.) If there is quadratic disutility of labor with y
thenCM) is satisfied so that randcxnization does not occur when
Xa >0Substituting into (Bii) shows that local randcii 7tion cannot
occur when >0.Whether nonlocal randcxnization can occur is unclear.
15. Stiglitz [1982aJ derived the conditions in Theorem VI and Corollary III
as sufficient for local randanizatiori over t bundles arising with equal
probability. The results here are stronger: these conditions are both
necessary and sufficient for any local randcznization to exist which
iziproves on the nonrandan solution. The same condition applies with any
arbitrary probabilities over three bundles. Due to an error in
calculation, Stiglitz [1982a] asserts a result opposite that of
Corollary II.
16. Transversatility conditions nust be checked to guarantee that this is a
valid solution.40
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PROOFOFTHEORHvI IV: (i) Let1(a) ir(a) C (a)and
h=1
-. k(i) ih Y1(a) 1rh(a)Y (a),i= a,b. ThensinceV1(C1, Y1) is strictlyconcave, h=1
V1((c), 11(a))EV1(a),withstrictinequalityifthe i lottery is
k(j) .
nondegenerate.If 1r.h(a)V1(CJh(a), yJh(a)) =EV1(a)then V1(3(a), • • h=1
13(a)) ES!1(a),with strict inequalityif the jlotteryis nondegenerate,
also follows fran the strictconcavity. By asstzrption, EV1(a)V1° so that
V1((a), 11(a)) V1° and V1(&(a), ?3(a)) >rqlOtrusthold.Since the
indifference curve through V10 istangent to the line C = Y, 1(ct) >?(a)and




-11(a))+ (&(a), 13(a)) soresourcebalance isviolated unless
theself-selection constraint for i holds with strictinequality.
(ii) Since even with randanizatjon thepoint (Vao, Vb0) mistlieon the
constrained utility possibility frontier, theproof follows as in that for
Theorn II.
(iii) Given (ii), this result followsexactly as the corresponding result
inTheornII.
(iv) Consider the firstorder conditionswith respect toeach and
ih in maximizationproblan(P11). In each ccxidition,,jhnultipliesevery
termso it drops out leaving conditions identical in form to those in(P1).
Since= 0, it is inirdiate that at each h, MRS3 (C3F, yih) = 1.
To see that k(j) >1is not needed at an optiimiii, consider thecase where
the self-selection constraint forgroup i holds with strict inequality (that42
is,fTrthV(C,i') > Tr.hV (C yih))Havingk(j)
>1in a
nondegenerate lottery so there existh arid k with lTjh and jk positive and
(Cjh,y.Jh) (cjk yjk)) cannotbe optimal. With the probabilities fixed,
consider a change in the(CJh, yJh) 'which uoves each closer to the mean bundle
without changing the mean. Such a shift willcontinue to satisfy both the
bounds on the cjhandand the resonrce balance constraint. The
probabilities do not change, satisfyingthe constraints that they si.mi to 1.
k￿j)-
Fran concavity,).. ¶.V1(C3", Y3 ) will rise but since theself-selection
h=1
constraintfor iholds withstrict inequality, if the shift is not too large,
kU)h h this constraint will still hold. Since L 1.hVJ(CJ ,Y3)rises,the
h=1
self-selection constraint for group j trust stillhold. Thus, the bundles
k,(j) •hh
after the shift yield a feasible lottery. Since . 1r.hVJ(CJ ,Y3) rises,
h=1
the objective function rises showing that the priorbundle was not optimal.
(v) The first order conditions with respect tocjh and jh are the sane
as those for C3 andY3 in (P1) since thejh
cancel fran the conditions.
Hence, the relations here can be shown exactly asin the proof of the Theoren
II. Unlike in that theorn, equal NRS's equal to unity cannot be ruled out.
To see that k(j) >3is not required, consider the optimal lotteries.
Fix the quantities (Ca',Y'), i=a,b, and h =1,...,k(i).Consider (P11)
as a linear progranming problnin the ir.Franpart (iv), one of the
lotteries is degenerate with =1.Fran part (ii),attxxst one
self-selection constraint cart bind. Thus, of thefive original constraints,
at nxst three (a self-selection constraint,the resc*irce balance constraint,
and the constraint that the probabilities inthe nondegenerate lottery sii to
1)arebinding. A solution exists with thetuther of nonzero variables no
greater than the nutiber of bindingconstraints. Q.E.D.43
PROOFOF THEORE2 V: The proof requires the following
Larrna I: Consider any utility function 11(X),any bundles X1, X2, and
with U(X1)>U(X)and 11(X3)> andany ,0<i < 1.There exists sa
concave increasing transformation V(X)=F(U(X))such that,rV(X') + (1 -
,r)V(X2)<V(X).
Proof: It is sufficient to provide an example ofa transformation under which
the result holds. Let U2 U&) considerF(U)
(U -U2)1".Then
V(X2)
=(U(X2)-U2)1=0for all n. The resultthen reduces tothere
existingan tiwithwV*(X')<V(X3). Thisin turn followsif there exists
anfor whichV*(X3)/V(X') =[(U(X3)-U2)/(U(X')- . Since
liin[(U(X3) -U2)/(U(X1)-U2)]1'=1and since iT< 1,theexistence ofthe
requiredn follows.
Q.E.D.
Proofof Theorn: Given a,let (C1, Y1) and(C3, Y3) be the solutions to
(P1).Since >0andNRS3(C3(a), Y3(cz))1 from Theorn 11(v), therenust
existt bundles (C1, yJi) and(C2,yJ2) with V(C1, Y3')=V(C2,y32) =
V3(C3(a),Y3(ct)) andsuch that C'— > C3(a)—Y3(a)>C—y32•
Therefore,a; I<< 1),mistexistwith ;C1 —y31)÷ (1 —;)(C2-yJ2)
=C3(a) -Y3(a). It also follows fran Theorn11(v)thatV1(&2, Y3 2) >
V'(C3 (a), Y3 (cx)) >V1(Cf, y3') since the indifferencecurve of jthrough
(C3(a), Y3 (a)) lies between indifferencecurveof i and the 450linethrough
that bundle(see Figure6). Fran Ltx I, there exists a transformationofV1
suchthat ;F(V1(C3l, yJi))+(1 -;)F(V(C2,y2)) <F(V1(&(ct),Y3(a))) =
F(V1(C1(cz),Y1(a)). Since V(C1, Y1) =V(C2y.]2)V3(C3(a), Y3(a)),
;V(Ci1yJi) + (1 -;)V(C2,y32) >V3(C1(a),Y'(a)) so the self—selection
constraintfor jcontinuesto be satisfied. The self-selection constraint for
i is now! satisfied with strict inequality. Hence, allconstraints hold. If44
1 >NRS3(C3(ci),y3()) >MRS1(C3(x),Y3(a)), the bundles (C1, Y) and(C2,
yi2) can be chosencloseenough to (C(a), Y3(cz)) sothat 1>MR&(C1, yJi)
and 1 >NRS3(C2, yJ 2)Thenconsiderthe bundles(C1 + , +5) and(C2
+yj2 + •Thesecontinue to satisfy resource balance. Forsmall enough
(5 >0,itwill still follow that;F(V(C1+ , +) + (1- ;)F(V1(&2+
i2 + <F(V(C1(c),Y1(ct))soits self-selection constraintstill
holds. Since 1 >MRSat bothbundles,V (C3 + ,y3+ 5) >V3(Cf, y31) anci
(C2 + ,yJ+ ) >V3(Cf, y32)Hence, the lottery((C1 +,y' + ,
(C2 + , + , ;) is feasible, raises i's 'welfare andthus improvesupon
thenonrandan solution (C3(c), Y(a)). If 1 <W&(C3(),Y3(a)) <NRS1(C3(a),
Y3(a))asimilarprooffollows with (C1 ,y3 and(C2,y -)
formingthe lottery improvingon (C3(a),Y3(c&)). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF 'flIEOREM VI: Frcxn Theorn IV, Xa> 0 implies Ab=0andsoit is not
desirable torandanizeA'stax schedule.Furthernore, theoptimal
randcii1zationto offer B need involve atnx)st three tax schedules.This
result carries over to finding lotteries which improve onthe rionrandcxn
solution to (P1) even iftheoptimal lottery is not found. That is,if a
lottery over k> 3bundlesis better than the nonrandan solution, a lottery
over just 3bundlesuiist exist which also does better. Hence, we canrestrict
the analysis to lotteries h'cbh,ybh) h =1,2,3,'where h=1.Let
(Ca, cb,b)denote the nonrandan solution to (P1).
A lottery exists which improves upon(Ca,1a,ci', Yb)if,holding
(Ca,ya)fixed:
bh (Al)
- + - Ybh0 (A2)
Ybh)Vb(d, Yb) (A3)45
and at least one of (Al) to (A3) holds with strict inequality. (Al) and(A2)
guarantee the lottery is feasible while (A3) says that B's expected utility
doesnotdecline.(Al) canbereplaced by an equality since, if it held with
strictinequality, a uan preserving shrinkofthelotterywouldcontinueto
satisfy (Al) andwould raiseXllhVb(CML,ybh)leaving (A3) satisfied. Since
(Al) is assunEd to hold withstrictinequality, a small rise inhVa(CbhI,ybh)
would notviolateit. Of course, such a shrinkage wouldcause (Al)to hold with
equality before all randamess waseliminated,else there wouldexista
nonrandanvectorbetterthan (Ca, Ya,cb, Yb), a contradiction. If (Al) holds
with strict inequality, Ca could be raised to get an improvaxent while, if(A3)
holds with strict inequality, the iinproveint is direct. SinceNa(Ca -)+
Nb(Cb -Yb) = 0,equation (Al) can be rewritten as
-Ybh)-d +Yb0 (A4)
Considerany probabilityvector 11 112, 113). A local randanizationisa
path(Ch(t), Y1'(t)), h=l,2,3 with (Ch(O), Yb(O))=(Cb,Yb),allh, and such
that for t>0at least two bundles with nonzero probabilities differ fran
eachother. A local randanizationisimprovingforthis probability vector if
a path exists with
Va(Ch(),Y"(t)) =Va(Cb,Yb) (AS)
-C'(t))Yb - C? (A6)
'Y'(t))vd, Yb) (A7)




______dCh(O)>o (A9) dt dt-
dC'(O)b(cb bdY1'(O)
dt ' dtI0 (AlO)
Substituting (A8) into (A9) and(AlO)yields:
d'Y'(O)o (All) [1MRSa(Cb, b)1 hdt
[}RSa(Cb, yb) -b(cbb)J dthW) (A.12) h dt
Frcxn Theorn 11(v),1 -!RSa(Cb,Y1) and 3I(Ib yb) -b(cb,b) mist
opposite signs sothat(All) and (A12) can both hold if and only if
______= oiich frcin (AS) inpliesthat dC'(O)
11hdt
=0.This,thefirst
ordereffectsalong an itxprovingpath nhist bezero. The gain to randomization
niist care fran secondorder effects. If either the second derivativesofnet
resourcesorof B' s expected utility arepositive,then, sincethe first
derivativesare zeroat t=0,for t>0,for t>0the first derivatives and
hence thefunctions will becai positive as required.Thesesecond
derivatives at t=0are:
JIhSha+ b)







d2d'co)+ vb(Cbb d(o) ,y) 2 (A15)
dt dt47
whereS' =(dCh(O))2V1 (Cb, Yb) + 2dYb(O)d(O)V1 (di, Yb) + (d))2 dt cc d cy
(cb, yb)Franthefact that theutility fiuictionsare strictly concave, yy
forany hwithdCh (0) /dtordY' (0) Idtnotzero, Smistbe negative. For
convenience, the argunentsofpartials of V1 are deleted since all partials
are evaluated at (Cb, Yb).
Substituting (A13)into(A14) and (A15) yields
Z (1NR h
d2Yh(O)+ hS'' 0 (A16) dt
-b1h
d2YT1(0)+ [(sbh/\,b) (S/V)] 0 (A17)
Solving (A16) for ii d'Y10) and substituting into (A17)gives:
1)(11 S) iv+(sbh) ,b-MRSa)z (A18) (1 _MRSa)h
(1 _MRSa)
Fran Theoran 11(v), 1 -MRSa,1 -band NRSb -uRSaall have
sign. Hence, (A18) can be rewritten as
______________________ - MRSaIz0 (A19)
v'ji._b,aI' NRSaI j _a b1
Given any It2, 113), apath (Ch(t),?1'(t)), h =1,2,3,yields a local
_____ dCi'(0) ran&njzatjon hich inroves on the nonrandcin solutionto (P1) iff
d(O) d2Ch(O) d2Y¼O)are suth that dCh(0) d?'(0) dt ' 2and ______ ______ dt dt0 but, for dt dt2
sare h,(dch(o) h dtdt x0,and (A15), (A16), and (A19) hold witha strict
inequality in (A16) or (A19). Note that since (1-MRSa)0and
are otherwiseunrestricted, forany(dCh(0)/dt,d(0)/dt), h =1,2,3,48
d'(O)/dt2, h =1,2,3,can be chosentomake Z defined in (A16)take any
value.Giventhischoiceof d2Yh(O)/dt2, h =1,2,3,d2Ch(O)/dt2, h =1,2,3,
canalwaysbe chosentomake (A13)hold.It therefore follows thatlocal
randcnizatiOn is desirableiffthere exists a (dC'(O) /dt,dyh(O) /dt),
h =1,2,3,such that
hS ___________ - b
>i-a
Necessityof (A20) follows directly frii (A19).If(A20)holds, then, given
(A16) d2Y1(O)/dt2 can be chosen tomake Z small enough that (A19)holds.
If (A20) holds, then for at least oneh,s'/(vl1 -b1)>
S/(VI1 - NRSaI)nijsthold. For this h, set X =(dd(O)/dt,d(O)fdt)and
necessity is shown. Toshowsufficiency, let =(, X) = (dCc(0)/ dt,
dYh(O) /dt),h=1,2,3and ass there exists a Y =(Y1,Y2) such that
>(?layt)/cJbIl-b)Given1' 2' and fl3
SC1I









111X]X2 + 11244+11344 ='l'2
(A25)




while(A23)-(A25)guarantee that T(XHb(h)t)=y}jbytand that49
=Hayt.Given the assunptions on Y, anysolution to(A21)-
(A25) would satisfy (A20). Since at least two of the11h trust be positive,





Y2[rr1/(n2(n1+112flj. Substitutingthese values shows that (A21)-(A25) are
satisfied shdng sufficiency. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF COROLlARY II:
Let 'a' "by =Ii - NRSaIq}bgt ggt me III, local
randcxnizatjon is desirable at sane'a and b' a'
>0. 1'a =
noredistribution is possible since their indifferencemaps areidentical so
=1.Hence Q a's, "by =o. DifferentiatingQ with respect to
around p=byields
c(P, P)=dli - Sat g}jbgt-dli - b1gHagt
(A26) vb V C a c
Since Va =F(Vb),V =F'V,'= F'VC+ r(vb)2 V =F'V+ r(vb)2 j
=F'V + F"VV. when a
=b'substituting these into (qHaqt)/V yields:





dQ(PP) qHbq df 1 -MRsaldli -b1 _____-
dl'a
__ 2dl1NRsal -
(q1
-
q2), (A28)
F' a